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Abstract
This paper provides a rationale for group support for political vio-
lence when violence does not provide a material benet. A theory of
fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may
not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilib-
rium in a game containing psychological payo¤s. For this to happen the
material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payo¤s are
expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of
each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence be-
cause the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers
the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can
only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrice
in choosing peace.
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1 Introduction
Fearon (2006) provides a survey of work on ethnic mobilisation and ethnic
violence. Within that survey he discusses explanations for ethnic violence.
Violent conict (whether ethnic or not) is a puzzle from a rationalist per-
spective as conict is ine¢ cient. In reviewing possible explanations he draws
attention to the idea that inter-ethnic violence is strongly related to intra-
ethnic politics and that violence is a tool by which political elites maintain
or increase their political support, but that the central theoretical puzzle
for such diversionaryarguments is why publics would increase their sup-
port for a leader who takes actions, such as provoking ethnic violence, that
by hypothesis makes them worse o¤. (p. 863). This paper will attempt to
address this theoretical puzzle.
Rationalist explanations for conict in models that treat groups as uni-
tary actors can be divided into the three main explanations reviewed by
Fearon (1995); bargaining failures due to private information (for example
in Cetinyan (2002)); commitment problems (for example in Fearon (2004))
and issue indivisibilities (as, for example, implied by Bernholz (2004)) on
terrorism and supreme values). Models that allow for intra-group hetero-
geneity and thus intra-group competition provide a richer environment for
exploring group conict and in particular the competition between doves
that are essentially unwilling to use violence to pursue their goals and hawks
who are willing to use violence to pursue their goals. In the next section
we will review the rationalist literature on support for violence which may
make sense from a material perspective (in the absence of commitment to an
e¢ cient outcome), but the crux of Fearons puzzle is the support for violence
where it does not provide an obvious material benet, in fact, the violence
leads to a predictable material loss. Problems of commitment and indivisi-
bilities still play a background role in this paper.1 The key di¤erence in the
setting depicted here, is that they are not su¢ cient to explain the existence
of group conict, as group conict is not depicted as the equilibrium of a
material game. Rather group conict emerges when emotions are added to
the analysis.
Rationalist explanations arguably su¤er from downplaying the role of
emotions when emotions clearly seem to play a central role in group conict.2
Fearon and Laitin (2000) observe that anger seems to play a clear role in
1Powell (2006) argues that indivisibilities can be subsumed under commitment prob-
lems.
2Horowitz (1985) famously wrote that A bloody phenomenon cannot be explained by
a bloodless theory. (p. 140).
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group conict, and such that it often seems to be the case that launching
an attack against a strong opponent provokes a predictably harsh response
which in turn generates in-group anger and support for violence. We might
extend this observation and argue that the same sort of mechanism is in
play within the strong group, namely that if launching a harsh response is
likely to prolong the terrorism and violence emanating from the weak group
surely then emotions must be playing a part in the support for the harsh
response. Sambanis (2004) provides a critique of empirical tests of economic
models of civil war such as Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoe­ er
(2004). As part of his call for greater use of case studies is the idea that
case studies do better at identifying micro-level details such as emotional
response. Sambanis argues that emotional and economic theories can be
combined with emotion-based explanations as focusing on the demand side
of the equation and economic models as focusing on the supply side. As
we develop more of the demand side, it becomes obvious that ideology and
psychology cannot be ignored as explanations of civil war. (p. 268). This
paper is an e¤ort in that direction; an attempt to set-up an emotionally
based model of the demand for violence but one that can be incorporated
within a rational choice framework.3
This paper explores a setting where one group is weak relative to a strong
group. This can be viewed as a relatively strong incumbent being opposed by
a relatively weak group where both groups contain peace-seeking doves and
hawks willing to use violence. In a choice between passivity and aggression
the strong group is depicted as having a dominant strategy to be aggressive
in response to whatever action the weak group takes. If the weak group is
aggressive, at a relatively small cost the strong group is better o¤ ghting
than conceding and if the weak group is passive for a small cost of aggression
the strong group is better o¤ claiming all of the issue under dispute than
striking a bargain with the weak group. In response to aggression by the
strong group the weak group should in its material interest concede since
ghting will only bring costly defeat for no gain over the issue.
Emotions are incorporated by turning to behavioural economics and Ra-
3Laitin (1995) calls into question macro level explanations for political violence, given
that macro conditions were similar in Catalonia and Basque Country and Ukraine and
Georgia. He argues that political violence became a feature of political interaction in
Basque Country and Georgia, but not in Catalonia and Ukraine because of di¤erences in
micro level factors. Demand for violence is implicit in his focus on social organization.
The analysis presented here will place emotionally driven demand for violence as a central
micro explanation for the existence of political violence and if such a demand is lacking,
political violence will not exist or cannot be sustained.
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bins (1993) theory of fairness and exploring why the weak group might
actually choose aggression in response to aggression. Rabins theory tells us
that so long as the stakes are not so high, we can expect to see reciprocal
behaviour such that harmful actions are met with harmful actions and help-
ful actions are met with helpful actions. A key challenge, however, for the
application studied here is to explain why we should ever expect the stakes
to be low when group conict is clearly a high stakes game? We point to the
crucial role of mass collective action. As groups become larger, individual
decisiveness in determining the group action falls such that the instrumental
stakes fall. This means that the indirect material costs of engaging in con-
ict may be discounted, but the direct expressive benets of reciprocation
may be exaggerated compared to their actual importance for ex post wel-
fare. As a result, weak group members may choose aggression as an angry
expressive response to aggression by the strong group, even though if they
were decisive they would not have made such a choice. If a su¢ cient number
of members choose aggression so that it satises a hawks desire for ego rents
(which could be viewed as positively related to the number of supporters)
and that doves are unable to prevent the hawks from acting then the group
will engage in aggression.
Fearons central puzzle focuses on members of a weak group supporting
violence that makes them worse-o¤. This paper pays close attention to
that idea, but extends the question to ask why the strong group may not
be inclined to reward seemingly helpful behaviour by the weak group and
thus provide for the Pareto superior outcome of mutual peace compared to
mutual aggression. We argue that it is important for members of the strong
group to actually believe that if the weak group chooses passivity that this
choice is not simply in their material interests in any case. If they believe
that the weak group is making sacrices in the pursuit of peace then peace
may be possible.
2 Related Literature
The key feature of this paper is that members of the competing groups may
support violent attacks on the other group, even though the violent attack
provokes a harsh response that makes group members materially worse-o¤.
The group approval provides an incentive for hawks to commit violence even
when there is no great likelihood that the violence will succeed. The para-
dox, as stated, is why the in-group public incentivise hawks (by providing
support) to use violence in situations where it makes them worse-o¤. The
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phenomenon of insurgent violence, met by incumbent crackdowns, followed
by support from members of both groups for the use of violence would seem
to be widespread. Fearon and Laitin (2000) in their unconventional review
of a number of books exploring ethnic conict nd considerable evidence
of the use of violence to construct antagonistic ethnic identities which gen-
erates more violence and material loss. Tessler and Robbins (2007) stress
the importance of public support for terrorists and explore Arab support for
attacks against the United States. Jaegar et al (2012) study the phenom-
enon of support for violence in Palestine. They nd that Palestinians that
spent their formative years (ages 14-17) during the rst Palestinian uprising
hold signicantly more radical positions than would be normally predicted,
whereas individuals who spent their formative years during the Oslo peace
negotiations are more moderate than would be predicted. This suggests
empirical evidence for the violence breeding violence thesis. Krueger and
Maleckova (2009) and Maleckova and Stanisic (2011) examine the e¤ect of
public opinion on terrorism and nd that terrorism is positively related with
unfavourable views of the target country. If this were not the case, the sup-
ply of terrorism would seem to be unrelated to support for it, so public
opinion appears to be a key motivator for violence. The importance of pub-
lic opinion is also given prominence in Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2011),
where they nd in the context of Iraq that improved service provision (the
opposite approach to a crackdown) reduces insurgent violence because the
public are more likely to share information with the government.
For the paradox to make sense there must be some alternative potential
set of dove leaders who would not use violence as a strategy. This points
us towards models of intra-group competition between doves and hawks.
Examples are Kydd and Walter (2002) who argue that the reason we see
the use of violence by extremists is to undermine trust between moderate
negotiators and the government. The government may be forced to conclude
that the moderates do not control their group and thus need to use violent
crackdowns to protect themselves. Hamlin and Jennings (2007) and Jen-
nings (2011) argue that the selection of hawks and the use of violence makes
sense when the anticipated cost of conict is relatively low. In this case it is
worth incurring conict costs because the hawks will produce a better bar-
gain than a dovish and peaceful approach. Whilst recognising intra-group
competition between doves and hawks the problem with approaches such as
these is that they do not tackle why publics increase their support for hawks
in response to crackdowns where it makes the publics materially worse-o¤.
Either the issue of public support is not addressed, or where it is addressed
support is o¤ered because the public calculate they are materially better-o¤
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supporting hawks.
There have been a number of papers where the use of violence to mo-
bilise support plays a central role. In de Figueiredo and Weingast (2001),
suppression by an in-group moves the preferences of moderates within an
out-group closer to radicals within the out-group. This provides a motive
for terrorism; the ultimate bargain may be closer to radical preferences.
In Rosendor¤ and Sandler (2004) the mobilisation of support is linked to
heavy-handed approaches by government. While both these papers recog-
nise the phenomenon they both assume that violence met with violence
generates support for the perpetrators of violence and they do not analyse
why this would be the case. Other papers have attempted to endogenise
the decision. In Ginkel and Smith (1999), dissident violence signals to the
public that they represent that the incumbent is fragile and as a result the
public may o¤er their support. This may succeed such as in the Velvet Rev-
olution in Czechoslovakia in 1989, or it may fail as in Tiananmen Square
in the same year. In the case of failure this looks like a potential answer
to the paradox, the motivation for support for violence or rebellion is that
supporters wrongly calculated that the rebellion would succeed. Siqueira
and Sandler (2006) model competition between government and terrorists
for supporters. The dilemma facing the government is that while a harsh
crackdown reduces the probability of success for terrorists and thus also
its attractiveness to potential supporters, shifting resources out of public
spending reduces the opportunity cost of supporting terror. Signicantly,
Siqueira and Sandler also include an exogenous parameter for underlying
support for terrorism. Bueno de Mesquita (2005) models terrorist recruit-
ment and Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) model the competition
between doves and hawks within a group rebelling against the government.
Similarly to Siqueira and Sandler, these papers argue that a crackdown in re-
sponse to violence can increase or reduce mobilisation, based on the balance
of increased security which reduces support against ideological fomentation
and reduced economic opportunity which increases support.
These papers provide an answer as to why public support might follow
crackdowns; economic opportunity and ideology may outweigh the e¤ect of a
reduced probability of winning. However, this is an instrumental explanation
for political support and thus does not address the paradox of support for
violence which by hypothesis makes the supporters worse-o¤. It appears
that there are a signicant number of cases where the material calculation
should really point towards the support for peaceful negotiation but yet
the support is for those that perpetrate violence. In the last three papers
discussed, ideology is an argument in the utility function and in the Bueno
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de Mesquita (2005) case, it is assumed to be increasing with the severity
of the crackdown. This is a non-economic, emotional dimension and the
endogenisation of emotional payo¤s and their trade-o¤with material payo¤s
provides the focus for this paper.
That emotions such as anger exist in conict is well-documented. Gor-
don and Arian (2001) nd that the stronger the threat, the more belligerent
the policy choice. They argue that when one feels threatened the decision-
making process with regard to policy is dominated by emotions rather than
logic. Halperin (2008) nds that group-based hatred helps to interpret
events and direct behaviour in a way that contributes to the continuation of
the conict. Maoz and McAuley (2008) look at the demand for aggressive
policies by a strong group in response to a weak group. They nd support
for both perception of threat and dehumanisation as determinants of de-
mand. The latter factor is clearly very worrying as it implies hatred as a
determinant of policy. Halperin and Bar-Tal (2011) analyse emotional fac-
tors that hinder the processing of proposals that could contribute to conict
resolution.
A crucial component of the analysis presented here is that emotional
decision-making in circumstances of conict may be expressive. This refers
to the idea that since individual decisions are unlikely to be decisive in
determining outcomes, instrumental decision-making which focuses on the
indirect benet of choosing X in order to achieve Y may give way to expres-
sive benets which focuses on the utility directly gained from making the
decision to choose X and this is disconnected from eventual outcomes. This
generates two key insights. First, it helps explain collective action where in-
strumental logic would suggest free-riding. Second, expressive choice, given
that it is inconsequential, may di¤er from the choice that would be pre-
dicted to be made instrumentally. Normatively, this may be good or bad
depending on the context. In this paper, both Pareto superior and infe-
rior outcomes emerging from expressive choice relative to the outcome that
would be predicted instrumentally will be considered. A key challenge for
theories of expressive choice is to provide a solid theoretical foundation. This
paper attempts to do this by identifying choices that di¤er from the stan-
dard approach by using the behavioural approach found in Rabins theory of
fairness and the focus on psychological payo¤s as a trade-o¤ with standard
material payo¤s. With the behavioural distinction established, expressive-
ness operates so as to amplify the importance of psychological payo¤s in
decision-making. The literature on expressive choice spans several decades
and is both theoretically and empirically rich. Although the idea was not
new, its signicance for democratic decision-making reached a wide audience
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with the publication of Brennan and Lomasky (1994). Hillman (2010) links
expressive choice to an individuals sense of identity. A sense of identity
and group belonging clearly seems relevant in the context of group conict.
Hillman describes socially inferior outcomes caused by expressive choice as
expressive policy traps. We will see the possibility of such an expressive
trap as the main focus of the analysis presented here, but we will also see
that expressive choice can create the possibility for peace that would not
otherwise exist.. For a broad overview of work on expressive choice which
also considers it in settings more broad than formal elections, see Hamlin
and Jennings (2011).
3 The Model
We begin by depicting the general form of the normal-form game played
between a weak and a strong group. Players can choose to be aggressive
or passive and the payo¤s are as follows where we start by considering a
two-player setting
Strong Group
agg pass
agg  caw; (R  cas) (R  cdw) ; 0
Weak Group
pass 0; (R  cds) R; (1  )R
Figure 1
We assume there is an issue or space that can be divided between the two
groups such that the allocation to each group sums to R. When one group
is passive and the other aggressive, the passive group receives 0 and the
aggressive group receives R. When there is mutual aggression the stronger
group wins and receives R while the weak group receives 0.4 cdw and cds
are aggression costs for the weak and strong groups when confronted by
passive opponents. These costs reect the idea that in order to repress the
other group some threshold level of military and other resources required for
governance needs to be invested in. The opportunity cost of this investment
4This is obviously a strong assumption. One might argue that ghts that appear
one-sided today may in the future lead to concessions and achieve their purpose. This
observation does not undermine the approach taken here. By showing that a weak group
may engage in conict with a strong opponent when defeat is guaranteed then clearly the
result is even more likely to hold if the weak group were likely to secure some concessions
through conict.
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is higher for the weak group than the strong group so that cds < cdw. The
costs of aggression for the weak group and strong groups when there is
mutual aggression are caw and cas.We assume that and cdw < caw and cds <
cas. This reects the idea that costs of aggression are higher when met by
aggression from the other side compared to passivity. If both groups are
passive, aggression costs are removed and there will be a distribution of the
issue or territory such that 0 <  < 1,  is assumed indivisible so that if
there is to be a peace deal regarding the distribution of R, then this is the
only one available. The focus of the paper is not on bargaining and how
commitment can be made to any bargain that is struck. The paper assumes
indivisibilities and commitment problems and depicts a game where the
existence of these problems is not su¢ cient to explain mutual aggression.
Rather they need to be combined with emotionality.
We assume that the ranking of the material payo¤s for each player (where
the best payo¤ is ranked 1 and the lowest payo¤ is ranked 4) is as follows
Strong Group
agg pass
agg 4, 3 1 or 2, 4
Weak Group
pass 3,1 1 or 2, 2
Figure 2
The payo¤s for the strong group are assumed to be unambiguous. The
best outcome for the strong group would be (pass, agg). This means that
they concede nothing and since the weak group does not resist the costs
of aggression are low. The next best is (pass, pass). We wish only to
study games where aggression is a dominant material strategy for the strong
group. Therefore,  > cds is an assumption, but one that is justiable where
bargaining outcomes cannot be smoothed so that it is not possible for the
value of  to be continuous from 0 to 1. Finally, we assume that mutual
conict with victory (agg, agg) is preferred to the avoidance of conict but
making full concessions to the weak group.
For the weak group the worst outcome is (agg, agg). They will lose the
conict because they are weak and thus gain no concessions despite incurring
aggression costs. The second worst outcome is assumed to be (pass, agg)
because they receive no concessions although they do not incur aggression
costs. We will analyse two di¤erent permutations of payo¤s based on the
following possibilities. If the weak group is very weak or  is relatively large
(pass, pass) may be preferable to (agg, pass) as the costs of aggression (even
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though the aggression is not reciprocated) may be too high to make it worth
pursuing full concessions. We will analyse two types of game. The rst will
consider the case where passivity is a dominant material strategy for the
weak group and the second where it is not. Note though that purely in
terms of material payo¤s, regardless of the ranking of (R  cdw) compared
to R there is only one pure strategy Nash equilibrium (pass, agg).
We will now incorporate the idea of Rabins fairness equilibria and dis-
cover that depending on the material stakes and whether (R  cdw) is greater
or less than R, the Nash equilibrium may be overturned and replaced with
fairness equilibria which imply either mutual aggression or mutual passivity.
Material stakes will become smaller as the membership of the two groups
increase because the probability of being decisive becomes smaller. This
requires expressive benets which are unrelated to decisiveness. A key part
of the analysis is identifying the nature of these expressive benets.
3.1 Fairness Equilibria
With the game set up, we need to recap on the key ingredients of Rabins
theory of fairness in games before applying it to the subject of this paper
- group conict.5 From the material game, a psychological game is derived
which will determine each players psychological utility. This will depend on
three factors. The weak groups strategy aw depends on their belief about
the strategy of the strong group bs and their belief about the strong groups
belief regarding their strategy cw. A similar description applies to the strong
player. We focus only on pure strategies, so all strategies and beliefs about
strategies are included in the set fagg; passg.
We derive a kindness function for the weak player 1, fw (aw; bs) and the
weak players perception of the strong players kindness efs (bs; cw). These
are expressed as follows
fw (aw; bs) =
s (aw; bs)  fairs (bs)
maxs (bs)  mins (bs)
(1)
and efs (bs; cw) = w (cw; bs)  fairw (cw)
maxw (cw)  min1 (cw)
(2)
5Other well-known models of fairness are presented in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher
(2006). These are less preferable to use as a basis for the approach presented here because
the main concern of the participants in this paper is with the intentions of the other group
rather than equality and modelling the game as simultaneous rather than sequential make
it considerably more tractable without any loss in essential insight.
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s (aw; bs) is the payo¤ received by the strong player given that they choose
strategy bs and the weak player chooses strategy aw. 
fair
s (bs) is dened
as [
hs (bs)+
l
s(bs)]
2 and refers to the mid-point between the highest and lowest
(Pareto e¢ cient) payo¤s the weak player could give to the strong player
given that the strong player plays strategy bs: If the numerator is positive
the weak player is being kind to the strong player. If it is negative the weak
player is being unkind and if it is zero the weak players behaviour is neutral
in terms of kindness. The function fw is weighted by the maximum payo¤
the weak player could give the strong player minus the lowest possible payo¤
(now including possibly Pareto ine¢ cient payo¤s) that the weak player could
give the strong player given their choice of bs. A Pareto ine¢ cient payo¤
obviously means playing a strategy that will make both parties worse-o¤
compared to an alternative available strategy open to the weak player. The
function ffs is analogous to fw and measures the weak players perception of
the strong players kindness towards him given their belief that the strong
player believes they are playing strategy cw. Analogous functions fs andefw are derived in the same way for the strong player. It will become clear
below how these payo¤s are depicted for the game we are analysing.
The following utility function for the weak player is assumed which in-
corporates material and psychological payo¤s
Uw (aw; bs; cw) = w (aw; bs) + efs (bs; cw) [1 + fw (aw; bs)] (3)
and similarly for Us (as; bw; cs).
w refers to the material payo¤and efs [1 + fw] refers to the psychological
payo¤. We can see from the psychological payo¤ that if the weak player
believes that the strong player is unkind
efs < 0 then the psychological
payo¤ would be maximised by choosing to be unkind towards the strong
player (fw < 0). The reverse is true if the strong player is perceived as being
kind and if the strong player is perceived as being neutral
efs = 0 then
the psychological payo¤ is irrelevant. Note though that the possibility of
the psychological payo¤ altering behaviour is dependent upon the material
payo¤ being relatively small. A contribution of this paper is to demonstrate
how a high stakes material game such as violent conict can be converted
into a game in which these stakes are reduced and psychological payo¤s can
change behaviour.
Finally, the pair of strategies (aw; as) 2 (agg; pass) is a fairness equilib-
rium if for i = w; s
(1) aw 2 argmaxaw2Sw U (a; bs; cw)
(2) cw = bw = aw
11
3.2 Analysis of the Game
Recall that in an environment where only material payo¤s count for utility,
regardless of whether (R  cdw) is greater or less than R there is a unique
pure strategy Nash equilibrium (pass, agg). Aggression is a dominant strat-
egy for the strong group and the best response for the weak group is to
choose passivity. We will demonstrate for small enough probability of being
decisive, in the case where R > (R  cdw), (agg, agg) is a unique fairness
equilibrium. In the case where R < (R  cdw) for small enough probabil-
ity of being decisive there are two fairness equilibria, (agg, agg) and (pass,
pass).
3.2.1 Case 1: R > (R  cdw)
We demonstrate the condition under which (agg, agg) would be the unique
fairness equilibrium. We rst consider a two player game which provides
a useful benchmark as each player is clearly decisive with regard to which
action is selected. We will then extend the analysis to n players in the two
groups simultaneously choosing their preferred action under the assumption
that they determine the outcome with probability dw = ds.6 It is assumed
that the payo¤s for each player in the n player case is the same as for the
players in the 2-player case. In the n player setting we will depict the supply
of violence as dependent upon the demand for violence in the most simple
manner. Some threshold level of support will be required for violence to be
selected as the group action. If acts of violence are perpetrated, but there
is insu¢ cient support within the group then violence cannot be sustained.
The purveyors of violence can be viewed as being motivated by ego rents,
where the ego rent is increasing in the number of supporters they attract.
This payo¤ is separate to any payo¤ that may be associated with winning
the conict and thus would explain why violence may be supplied by a group
in a situation where the violence has no realistic probability of success.
One member in each group We begin by deriving efs. If the weak group
member believes that the strong group believes they are choosing aggression
and the strong group chooses aggression in response, they are being unkind
6Note that dw and ds are treated as exogenous. It could be argued that they should
be endogenous as they are determined by the strategies of all the group members, but
conducting such an analysis would be a major distraction from the core message of the
paper. The reality of collective action is that as group size increases, the probability of
being decisive decreases. This is what is depicted here.
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to the weak group as shown by
efs =  caw   12 (R  cdw   caw)
(R  cdw) + caw =  
1
2
(4)
If the weak group chooses aggression when they believe that the strong
group chooses aggression then
fw =
(R  cas)  (R  cds)
(R  cds)  (R  cas) =  1 (5)
If the weak group deviates and chooses passivity when they believe that the
strong group chooses aggression then
fw =
(R  cds)  (R  cds)
(R  cds)  (R  cas) = 0 (6)
Note that there is only one Pareto e¢ cient choice in response to the
choice of aggression by the strong group namely to choose passivity.
The weak group will choose aggression rather than passivity in response
to aggression by the strong group if
 caw   1
2
[1  1] > 0  1
2
[1  0] (7)
which reduces to
1
2caw
> 1 (8)
It is straightforward to check that the strong group would choose ag-
gression in response to weak group aggression. As part of their utility
function, efw =  1: So the strong group will choose aggression because
(R  cas)   1

1  12

> 0   1 1 + 12. It is both materially and psycho-
logically preferable for the strong group to choose aggression. It is also
straightforward to see that (pass, pass) cannot be a fairness equilibrium.
The crucial point is that in this case efw = 0. If the strong group chooses
passivity, it is in the material interest of the weak group to also choose pas-
sively so there is no act of kindness associated with the choice. Since there is
no kindness displayed there is no incentive for reciprocity and only material
payo¤s count for the strong group and as a result they will choose aggression
in response to passivity chosen by the weak group.
In this setting, the addition of psychological payo¤s would not alter the
equilibrium of the game. Given that caw is to be viewed as a very large
number (8) will not hold. Psychological payo¤s are swamped by material
payo¤s and the equilibrium will be (pass, agg).
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n members in each group The analysis is now extended to allow for
large groups. It is assumed that when each individual j in each group
makes a decision their choice of action makes that group action more likely
with a probability of dw and ds. In the following analysis aw and as are
the probabilities that the groups choose aggression regardless of the choice
of individual j and pw and ps are the probabilities that the groups choose
passivity regardless of the choice of individual j. Obviously a + p + d =
1 for both groups:To capture the role of expressive payo¤s a weight  is
introduced where 0    1: This is distributed across members of each
group. A weak group member j will choose aggression rather than passivity
in response to aggression by the strong group if
material payo¤s
f awcaw + pw0  dwcawg
psychological payo¤s
+aw0 + dw0  pw 1
2
(1  jw) + pw0jw

>
material payo¤s
f awcaw + pw0  dw0g
psychological payo¤s
+aw0 (1  jw)  aw 1
2
jw   dw 1
2
  pw 1
2

(9)
which reduces to
jw >
dw (2caw   1)
1  dw (10)
If jw = 0 an individual fully absorbs the psychological payo¤ that comes
from the group decision. So, for example, if the weak group chooses passivity
in response to aggression by the strong group, even though the individual
chooses aggression he will experience a psychological payo¤ of  1=2. If
jw = 1 regardless of the group choice, the individual will receive a psycho-
logical payo¤ related to his own choice. So if the group choose passivity in
response to strong group aggression, but the individual chooses aggression
his psychological payo¤ will equal zero. This is an expressive payo¤. The
choice of an action brings a direct expressive payo¤ and if j = 1 the choice
is fully expressive. The action brings a direct psychological payo¤ which is
unrelated to the actual outcome of the game. Essentially, in the example
discussed above the individual when choosing aggression but not causing ag-
gression still receives a higher psychological payo¤ for his reciprocal choice.
For any jw > 0 there is an expressive component to the individuals
choice, and from (9) we see that in the limit where jw = 1 aggression will
be selected by an individual if 12caw > dw: Earlier we stated that in a 2-
player game we would not expect (8) to hold because dw is equal to one
and caw is assumed large. If n is also large the analysis changes because
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the instrumental stakes have been lowered by the lower probability of being
decisive and for jw > 0 the individual receives an expressive payo¤ even
though they are not decisive in determining whether the group behaviour is
reciprocal or not. If the number of members of the weak group satisfying
(10) passes the threshold necessary to provide hawks within the group the
incentive to engage in violence and that they are not prevented by the doves
within the group then aggression will be chosen as the group action. Clearly
the smaller the threshold the more likely that aggression will be selected.
This implies that a minority of the group in supporting violence may inict
conict costs on all the group as the suppliers of violence require only a
relatively low level of support, assuming that the doves cannot prevent the
aggression from occurring. 7
As is the case in the 2-player game it is straightforward to show that
strong group members will choose aggression in response to aggression by
the weak group because
(as + ds)

R  cas   1
2

+ ps

0  3
2
(1  js)  1
2
js

>
as

R  cas   1
2
(1  js)  3
2
js

+ (ps + ds)

0  3
2

(11)
which must hold because both the material and psychological payo¤s are
higher by choosing aggression than passivity.
Also it is straightforward, as before, to show that (pass, pass) cannot
be a fairness equilibrium in the n-player game. The weak group shows
no kindness towards the strong group in choosing passivity in response to
passivity so psychological payo¤s drop out. As a result, aggression is the
best response for all members of the strong group.
In the Rabin analysis games played between two players are analysed.
In these cases for psychological payo¤s to dominate and fairness equilibria
7Note that  is treated as exogenous, but it may be worth speculating whether that
is likely to be the case in reality. Political competition will be fought between doves and
hawks. The former within the weak group may have to depend on cognitive arguments
regarding the costs of conict, whereas hawks can make emotional appeals based on recip-
rocal aggression. That emotional appeals may be more e¤ective than cognitive appeals
is supported by Gadarian (2010) who nds, in the context of foreign policy attitudes in
response to terrorism, that emotional cues rather than threatening information alone inu-
ence attitudes. Sheafer and Dvir-Gvirsman (2010) nd, in the context of attitudes towards
the Oslo peace process, that the public response to negative framing is much stronger than
to positive framing. Hawks by recommending aggression frame the interaction with the
other group negatively.
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to emerge the stakes need to be relatively small. So for example, if we con-
sider emotional rejection of o¤ers in the ultimatum game, they are rejected
because the psychological gain from rejecting the o¤er outweighs the low
material gain. Rabin provides several convincing arguments to defend the
theory against the charge that it is only relevant when it is relatively trivial
and this paper attempts to extend this defence to incorporate the nature of
group choice in a political setting. We argue that the act of choosing to meet
aggression with aggression satises a sense of righteous indignation even if
actual aggression does not take place. The material payo¤, on the other
hand, is subject to standard instrumental reasoning. Although the stakes
may be exceptionally large if decisive, in mass political action individual
decision-makers determine the outcome only with a small probability.8
3.2.2 Case 2: R < (R  cdw)
We now turn to the case where R < (R  cdw) Inspection of the payo¤s
in the game inform us that the weak group would be displaying kindness
towards the strong group if they choose passivity in response to passivity
by the strong group and it is this that allows for the possibility of a (pass,
pass) equilibrium and the maximisation of social surplus. The condition for
(agg, agg) to be a fairness equilibrium (10) are the same as before. We now
demonstrate the conditions for (pass, pass) to be an equilibrium. The value
of efs is now efs = R  12R
R  0 =
1
2
(12)
If the weak group chooses passivity fw = 12 and if they deviate and choose
aggression, fw =  12 . Therefore, passivity will be chosen if
(aw + dw)

R  cdw + 1
4

+ pw

R+
3
4
(1  jw) + 1
4
jw

<
aw

R  cdw + 1
4
(1  jw) + 3
4
jw

+ (pw + dw)

R+
3
4

(13)
8The depiction of three possible states mirrors the analysis of peace, repression and war
presented in Besley and Persson (2011). They argue that a lack of highly valued public
goods and an uneven share of political power prevents peace. Whether or not there is war
or repression depends on relative ghting abilities and costs of ghting. If one side has a
clear advantage then we should expect repression. The analysis presented here suggests
that this is not necessarily the case. If emotions are high, demand for violence is high and
this support may generate su¢ cient ego rents to incentivise the supply of violence even
when it has little hope of success.
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which reduces to
jw >
dw (2 (R (1  )  cdw)  1)
1  dw (14)
For the strong group, efw = 12 so members will choose passivity over aggres-
sion if
(as + ds)

R  cds + 1
4

+ ps

(1  )R+ 3
4
(1  js) + 1
4
js

<
as

R  cds + 1
4
(1  js) + 3
4
js

+ (ps + ds)

(1  )R+ 3
4

(15)
which reduces to
js >
ds (2 (R  cds)  1)
1  ds (16)
There are now two pure strategy fairness equilibria subject to (10), (14) and
(16) holding for su¢ cient numbers of group members. At rst glance this
might look like a trivial problem of equilibrium selection. Since (pass, pass)
Pareto dominates (agg, agg) then it would be expected that (pass, pass)
will emerge as the equilibrium outcome. There are, however, a number of
issues to explore. First, although (14) and (16) may hold for individual
members of each group, it may not be the case that there is a su¢ cient
support for peace that will discourage the potential suppliers of violence
from providing it. In this case (pass, pass) cannot be an equilibrium even
though we are in a scenario compared to case 1 where a positive level of
support for peace can be generated in the strong group. This is particularly
true if the level of support required for violence to occur is a minority of
the group(s) population. Supposing the RHS of (10) and (14) to be of
similar value, the same set of members who support reciprocal aggression
in (10) support reciprocal passivity in (14). If the number in the former
is a minority but su¢ cient to induce violence then it will be insu¢ cient to
prevent violence in the latter.
An interesting implication here is that those that are low in expres-
siveness (low ) support passivity against aggression in (10) and aggression
against passivity in (14). This makes sense. These are individuals that do
not have a strong sense of indignation when confronted by an aggressive op-
ponent so they also lack a sense of obligation when confronted by a passive
opponent. Both cases might point to di¤erent types of conict trap. In case
1, there are a su¢ cient number of individuals in the weak group that feel
indignation such that they will provide support for aggression. In this case
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expressiveness causes conict. In case 2 there may be an insu¢ cient num-
ber of individuals in both groups that feel a sense of obligation to the other
group, such that support for aggression is su¢ cient for mutual aggression in
equilibrium. In this case, a lack of expressiveness is the cause of conict.
When only a minority support for aggression is required, it is still possible
that (14) will provide su¢ cient support for peace if the RHS of (14) is
su¢ ciently smaller than the RHS of (10), or R (1  )  cdw < caw. Clearly
this is more likely to hold the larger is caw and the smaller the gain to
the weak group in choosing aggression rather than passivity, given that the
strong group chooses passivity. For the strong group (16) is more likely
to hold if R is close to cds which means that there is little to be gained
materially aggression over passivity.
Clearly both (14) and (16) are likely to hold if the perceptions of deci-
siveness ds and ds are very small. In this case low levels of expressiveness
would still be su¢ cient to generate mutual peace. So if we suppose this
is the case, it would be tempting to conclude that because (pass, pass)
Pareto dominates (agg, agg) then we should expect the former to emerge as
the equilibrium. Is it unrealistic to suppose that the latter outcome would
struggle to emerge? One reason (although delving beyond the connes of
the current model) would be that if there is no history of trust between the
groups, that group members are emotional and that they perceive each other
as inherently aggressive then (agg, agg) seems a quite plausible candidate as
the equilibrium. It is clear that these features would appear to be common
characteristics of many conicts.
Finally, one key aspect of the analysis here is that roughly the same
individual that will feel indignation when they feel they have been wronged
will feel obligation when the other group is conciliatory. Perhaps, in reality,
the two responses are not symmetric as Baumeister et al (2001) suggest in
their discussion of bad is stronger than goodand O¤erman (2002) in his
discussion of hurting hurts more than helping helps. If this is the case
although the payo¤s exist so that positive reciprocation should exist, any
psychological tendency for the badto drive out the goodmay eliminate
the possibility of a peaceful equilibrium. An explanation that both papers
o¤er for this is self-serving bias, so that good events are attributed to internal
causes, but bad events are attributed to external causes.9
9This insight would, of course, be in keeping with our earlier discussion regarding the
possibility that  may be endogenous to political competition between doves and hawks. It
may not just be that  is positively responsive to emotional rather than cognitive appeals,
it may also be more responsive to negatively framed emotional appeals than emotional
appeals that are positively framed. Indignation may be a more powerful motivator than
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4 Conclusion
Section 3 nished in an optimistic (if guarded) fashion. When it is the case
that the weak group is actually making material sacrices to choose passivity
in response to passivity by the strong group then mutual peace may emerge
as a fairness equilibrium. But the main inspiration for this paper was to ra-
tionalise irrationalconict, not to rationalise irrationalpeace. So where
we observe mutual conict of the sort exhibited in this paper, what has been
the cause? If we turn to case 1, the cause is straightforward. Members of the
strong group do not see any sacrice on the part of the weak group members
if they were to choose passivity. For that reason, they will choose aggres-
sion in response to passivity as it maximises their material payo¤. If the
weak group were purely materially motivated (pass, agg) would be the Nash
equilibrium of the game. However, because weak group members (having
discounted their likelihood of being decisive) may be angered by the aggres-
sion shown by the strong group they may emotionally choose aggression in
response. Clearly, aggression would then be the materially and emotionally
best response by the strong group and thus irrationalconict can emerge.
The irrationality can be viewed from the perspective that there are two
outcomes that are Pareto superior to (agg, agg), namely (pass, agg) and
(pass, pass). The latter su¤ers from the familiar public good type problem
that it is a dominated strategy for the strong group and thus it is individu-
ally rational for strong group members to choose aggression. Although the
reason for (pass, pass) not being an equilibrium in case 1 is clear enough
it does beg the question explored by Fearon (1995) as to why an outcome
which would maximise social surplus cannot be reached. He provides three
main reasons; 1) asymmetric information; 2) commitment problems and 3)
issue indivisibilities. This paper does not dig deeply into why an ine¢ cient
outcome is allowed to persist, but in the context of this paper both commit-
ment problems and issue indivisibilities would be relevant. The innovation
in this paper is to argue that emotions are required in addition to these
problems to generate mutual aggression, otherwise the outcome would be
the peaceful (though ine¢ cient) dictatorship by the strong group. The (agg,
agg) outcome is driven by emotions of the kind explored by Rabin, but the
explanation for why they feature heavily in this paper is not that the stakes
are small, but rather that the stakes are made to seem small due to mass
collective action rendering individuals largely non-decisive in determining
political outcomes.
obligation.
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Case 2 is clearly more hopeful, but an (agg, agg) outcome is still a fairness
equilibrium. This case opens issues in the study of conict for which this
paper might provide some initial insights. In case 1, ultimately the reason
there is conict is that from the perspective of the strong group passivity
displayed by the weak group provides them with no positive utility through
reciprocation. If the weak group could be viewed as making a sacrice then
those that seek peace within the strong group would have something to work
with when ghting for support.
So in a richer model with incomplete information, it would be interesting
to explore the idea that the true state of payo¤s for the weak group is
unknown to the strong group. If the strong group holds that on observing
passivity by the weak group that the weak group is playing its dominant
strategy, an emotionally charged weak group may ensure that these beliefs
are held out-of-equilibrium as they would only choose aggression anticipating
aggression by the strong group.10 To that extent, it shifts the attention from
focussing on why the weak group takes actions that clearly seems against
their material interest to the way in which group interaction is perceived
within the strong group. If it is the case that the weak group really can
make sacrices it is important for the prospects for peace that members of
the strong group can come to believe this and that they can enjoy utility
from positive reciprocity just as they can enjoy hurting the other group if
they feel it is hurting them. If they do, mutual peace becomes a possibility
if political interaction is treated as emotional as well as material in nature.
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